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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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3. American official comments on first Nationalist evacuees from Burma:

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The American army attache in Thailand, presently supervising the evacuation of Chinese Nationalist troops from Burma, reports that the first 155 evacuees have shown excellent discipline but that they are mostly headquarters and supply personnel, many of them suffering from malaria. Moreover, the failure of the Nationalists to bring their weapons with them has increased the suspicions of Burmese observers and correspondents.

The attache adds that the Nationalist representative on the evacuation committee has confidentially asserted that the guerrilla commanders in Burma are disregarding Taipei's evacuation orders.

Comment: These developments are likely to strengthen the Burmese belief that any Nationalist withdrawal would be merely a token maneuver. Meanwhile, the evacuation proceedings have been disrupted, at least temporarily, by a Burmese order to the evacuation committee to return to the Thai side of the border. This action grew out of a Burmese claim that 38 members of the second contingent of evacuees are Burmese nationals.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Comment on Mossadeq's trial:

The opening of former prime minister Mossadeq's trial indicates that he will attempt to use the court as a sounding board to embarrass the Iranian government through a review of his program. He is also setting the stage for his own martyrdom.

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Mossadeq's references to his two-year struggle with the British indicate that allegations of foreign influence in Iran may become a major part of his defense, although his full argument on this point will not appear until the competency of the court has been established. The charge of foreign influence will arouse popular sentiment and make it more difficult for Prime Minister Zahedi to reopen diplomatic relations with Britain or to settle the oil dispute.

Mossadeq's apparent desire to make sure that he is remembered as a national hero and his allegations that the court had prejudged him highlight the government's dilemma in the case. Mossadeq probably will be found guilty of treason, but there is as yet no indication as to whether a death penalty would be carried out.

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5. Comment on the death of King Ibn Saud:

The death of King Ibn Saud and the succession to the throne of Crown Prince Saud offer no immediate prospect of change either in the central government's authority or in the present position of American oil and military interests in Saudi Arabia. Saud, who long acted for his father, was appointed commander in chief of the armed forces last August and became the country's first prime minister in mid-October. [REDACTED] there is no evidence that Ibn Saud's death will occasion an immediate struggle for power.

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Since the new king previously was supported by the authority of his father, however, he has yet to prove his ability in handling his brother Faisal, now designated crown prince, and also such influential officials as Finance Minister Sulaiman and Deputy Foreign Minister Yassin. His adroitness in holding the kingdom together will also be tested in his dealings with powerful tribal sheikhs. He faces additional problems from the new labor unrest in the oil industry.

Saud has been reservedly friendly toward Americans, but there is no indication that he will be easier to deal with than his father on either oil matters or arrangements for the air base at Dhahran. There is no indication that he will be more willing to compromise with Britain on the Buraimi dispute. [REDACTED]

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EASTERN EUROPE

6. New Hungarian economic policy creates dissension among party leaders:

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The American legation in Budapest believes that the 31 October resolution of the Hungarian Workers' Party central committee indicates that the government's

new economic program is meeting resistance from important party and government officials and has failed to win the support of middle and low-level party workers. The resolution also reveals that recent government measures to reduce economic difficulties have done little to mitigate popular antagonism toward the regime.

The legation points out that the resolution, which is an amazingly frank admission of the party's failure to implement the economic policy launched in July, does not appear to change the policy's original goals.

Comment: The week's delay in publishing this resolution, as well as a similar delay in publicizing Premier Nagy's recent criticism of the government's past agricultural policy, suggests that dissension exists within the party hierarchy. This is the first public endorsement of Hungary's new economic program by the party.

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